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Authors' Rights in France: The Moral Right of the
Creator of a Commissioned Work to Compel the
Commissioning Party to Complete the Work
by

ANDRt FRANCON*

I.

AND JANE C. GINSBURG**

Introduction

The French law protecting authors' rights' incorporates two distinct regimes of rights, "pecuniary" rights, and "moral" rights. As
the denomination indicates, pecuniary rights pertain to the author's
economic interests, and provide the author a monopoly in the reproduction and public performance of his work. 2 Moral rights safeguard
the author's "personality" interest in his work. Despite the appellation "moral" rights, the author's claims under French law to the security of his personality as expressed in his work are not precatory:
moral rights entail several distinct and enforceable interests. These
are: the right to make the work known to the public ("droit de divulgation"); the right to withdraw the work from publication ("droit de
repentir") 4; the right to have the author's name associated with the
work'; and the right to have the work be respected - generally
* Professor, Universit de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences Sociales de Paris (University
of Paris II).
** Member of the New York Bar, Fulbright Scholar (1984-85), University
of Paris II.
© Copyright, 1985, Andre Franoon and Jane C. Ginsburg
1. This article refers to French protection of "authors' rights" rather than to French
"copyright." While the French term "droit d'auteur" (meaning both "law of the author"
and
"authors' rights") is often translated as "copyright," "droit d'auteur" comprehends
rights
broader than does "copyright," as the term is understood in the United States. In
addition,
the concept of "authorship" in France is strictly personal: a corporation cannot be considered
an "author." Similarly, in France the author is the person who creates the work: authorship
is not attributed to the person or corporation on whose behalf the work was created.
See Law
of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 3. Compare, Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 3 with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)
("author" of a work for hire is the employer, or in certain circumstances, the commissioning
party. The employer or commissioning party need not be a physical person to be deemed
a
statutory author.)
2. See Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 26 (conferring exclusive rights of reproduction
and
performance); art. 41, cl.
I (exempting certain nonpaying private performances).
3. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 19.
4. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 32.
5. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6.
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called the right of integrity.0 The right of integrity comprehends the
right to prevent the work from being destroyed or mutilated. The
concept of destruction or mutilation extends to more than physical
damage to works of the plastic arts. It denotes any nonconsensual
alteration to a work of authorship, whether literary, artistic, musical,
or other, which deforms, substantially recasts, or misrepresents the
creator's conception of the work.7 While pecuniary rights endure for
the author's life and fifty years following his death,8 and may be
granted in whole or in part, 9 the French copyright act declares moral
rights to be "perpetual, inalienable, and indefeasible." 10
The French moral rights regime has long fascinated American copyright commentators." Decrying American copyright's inadequate
protection of authors' personality interests in their work, several of
these commentators have advocated interpretations or amendments
of the domestic copyright law to accommodate the creator's moral
concerns."2 Congress has had several bills before it, which it has repeatedly failed to enact, which would extend rights of integrity and
of attribution to creators of works of the plastic arts. 8 New York and
California and now Massachusetts have adopted limited forms of
moral rights protection for visual artists."
6. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6. With respect to all four moral rights, see generally H.
Desbois, Le Droit d'Auteur en France, 1 384-461 (3d ed. 1978); C. Colombet, PropriitiLittiraire et Artistique, 139-62 (2d ed. 1980).
7. See generally H. Desbois, supra note 6, at 11 440-48.
8. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 21.
9. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, arts. 30, 35. The French author's rights act does, however,
contain many further provisions designed to protect authors against improvident grants of
rights. See generally Francgon, La Liberti contractuelle dans le domaine du droit d'auteur, 1976
D. Chron. 55.
10. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6. While article 6 covers only the rights of attribution and
of integrity, it is generally agreed that all moral rights are inalienable. See Franlon, supra
note 9, at 56.
. 11. See, e.g., Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1940); Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4
Am. J. Comp. L. 506 (1955); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 Hastings
L.J. 1023 (1976); DaSilva, Droit Moral and Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 1 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 Am.
J. Comp..,L. 487 (1968); Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right, Issues and
Options, 29 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 31 (1979); Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity:
Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60
Geo. L.J. 1539 (1972); Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act of
1976, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1490 (1979).
13. See, e.g., H.R. 288, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1979) ("Visual Artists' Moral Rights Amendment," proposed by Rep. Drinan; H.R. 1521, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984) (identical bill, introduced by Rep. Frank).
14. See "California Art Preservation Act," Cal. Civ. Code, § 987 (West. Supp. 1981);
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This article does not purport to debate the wisdom of importing a
moral rights regime to the United States. Rather, in reviewing two
recent French moral rights controversies, the article's main purpose
is to inform American readers of some major developments in the
field in France, and to set the two cases against the background of
French moral rights theory and case law. Appreciation of that background warrants a few comparative and general observations.
First, the reader should be aware that the basis for American copyright law is fundamentally different from the theory underlying
French protection of author's rights and especially their moral rights.
The American copyright scheme, as set forth in the Constitution, envisions the exclusive grant of economic rights as an incentive to authors to create works which benefit the public. 5 In France, by contrast, "the sole fact of [a work's] creation" supplies the basis of the
author's protection. 6 French protection of authors and their moral
rights thus is not an incident of an exchange between creators and
society; it derives more from notions of natural rights. The author is
protected because his work represents an aspect of his personality."7
The conceptual source of the author's moral rights protection generates practical consequences. Under a moral rights regime, the per"Artist Authorship Act," 1983 N.Y. Laws, ch. 994, § 228-n. With respect to the New York
act, see generally Damish, The New York Artists' Authorship Act: A Comparative Critique,
84 Colum. L. Rev. 1733 (1984). With respect to Massachusetts see chapter 488 of the Acts of
1984, which was signed by the Governor of Massachusetts on January 8, 1985.
In addition, the right of integrity has received some limited protection through application
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). See Gilliam v. ABC, 538
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Comment, The Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Right and the
Lanham Act, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 611 (1977).
Finally, the decision in WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video Inc., 693 F.2d
622, reh'g denied, 693 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1982), which disqualifies the deletion of the
teletext portion of retransmitted television signals from the copyright act's "passive carrier"
exemption, 17 U.S.C. § III (1976), was based in part on the notion that unauthorized truncation of a work of authorship constitutes copyright infringement. See generally Barnett,
From New Technology to Moral Rights: Passive Carriers, Teletext, and Deletion as Copyright Infringement-the WGN Case, 31 J. Copyright Soc'y 427 (1984).
15. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides: "The Congress shall have power... [to] promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discussing the constitutional rationale for copyright
protection).
16. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 1.
17. See, e.g., Civ., June 25, 1902, [19021 1 S. 305, note Lyon-Caer, [1903] 1 D. 5, cond.
Baudoin, note Colin (the right of integrity is "inherent in the personality" of the author). See
generally H. Desbois, supra note 6, at 449 ("The author is protected as such, in his quality
as an author, because a link unites him to the object of his creation. In the French tradition,
parliament has repudiated the utilitarian conception of protecting works of authorship in
order to stimulate literary and artistic activity.").
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sonality interest persists intact regardless of the grant of economic
rights in a work, 8 and, at least in certain circumstances, despite
19
transfer of possession of the physical copy of the work. Inherent in
a moral rights regime, therefore, is the possibility of conflict with
rights of contract and property. With respect to contract rights, the
"inalienable" character of moral rights may act to nullify contractual
waivers. It appears that a general advance waiver of moral rights is
void: at most, only express and narrowly defined contractual waivers
may be enforced, and any ambiguity will be interpreted against
waiver.2 0
With respect to property rights, the potential conflicts may be even
more acute. On the one hand, French law proclaims "the most absolute right" of the property owner to enjoy and dispose of his property, so long as his use is not legally prohibited." The prerogatives of
the property owner would therefore include the right to destroy or
damage his property. On the other hand, the "indefeasible" character of moral rights may temper the absolutism of the property
owner's prerogatives in relation to artistic works. Without this, the
property owner's right to mutilate or destroy would imply that the
owner's acquisition of the physical object cuts off the artist's right to
ensure the integrity of his work.
Where the owner retains the artwork solely for his private view
and enjoyment, enforcement of the right of integrity may well be
curtailed, or at least suspended. A violation of the right of integrity,
18. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 6, art. 56 cl.2 (publisher-grantee of reproduction rights
may not, without author's written permission, modify the work in any way); Paris, Mar. 12,
1936, 1936 D.H. 257 (moral rights "attaching to the person of the artist, permit him in the
event of a grant of [economic] rights, to insist on the integrity of his work as a whole and in
its details"). See generally H. Desbois, supra note 6, at 1 444.
19. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 29 (providing that the incorporeal property rights defined
in article 1-which includes moral rights-subsist in the author and are independent of the
ownership of the physical object.) Despite the sweep of its language, article 29 is often viewed
as addressing only the enforceability of an author's economic rights against property owners.
Under this view, article 29 implicates the right of integrity only in the context of creators
who require the preservation of their works in order to exercise their rights of reproduction.
See C. Colombet, supra note 6, at 154. Nonetheless, both the case law and the commentators
have indicated that the right of integrity may be enforceable against a property owner who
displays the work publicly. See C. Colombet, supra note 6, at 154-56; see also infra notes 2122, and accompanying text.
64
20. See generally R. Plaisant, Jurisclasseur Propriiti Littiraire etArtistique fas. 8,
(1981); Lindon, note accompanying the decision of Civ. Ire, Jan. 8, 1980, 1980 J.C.P. II No.
19336; Francon, supra note 9, at 56. See also Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 32. (entitling authors to withdraw works even before publication, and despite the grant of rights to publish
the work).
21. Code civil, art. 544.
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like a violation of other rights of personality, seems to comprehend
an element of publicity. " Thus, it would appear that only public exposure of an altered work violates the artist's personality interests. 23
But where a work is destined for public display, or at least is accessible to members of the public, the proposition that acquisition of the
physical object abrogates the right of integrity would seem inconsistent with the concept of the indefeasiblity of moral rights. The principle that moral rights are indefeasible and inalienable thus would
leave the owner of a publicly displayed artwork with less than complete dominion over the physical object. The owner may enjoy the
property, but the rights to alter or destroy the object remain in the
creator's hands.2 4 Property ownership of artistic works therefore may
be "conditional, to the extent that the artist remains, forever, the
owner of a right which affects the object itself."'25
The tension between moral rights on the one hand, and contract
and property rights on the other hand, surfaced starkly in two recent
French decisions, Dubuffet v. Rgie Renault", and Huygue v. T.F.1.17 In
22. Cf. C. Civ., art. 9 (mandating respect for personal privacy). The article codifies decisions awarding relief for unauthorized publication of one's name or image. See generally R.
Lindon, Une Criation Pritorienne:Les Droits de la Personnaliti9-118 (1974).
23. See generally Nerson, Jurisprudence Fran~aise en Matire de Droit Civil, 1977 Rev.
Trim. Dr. Civ. 740, 740-41; Fran~on, note accompanying Paris, July 10, 1975, Jan. 1977
RIDA 114, 121.
Although some early moral rights decisions equated unauthorized alterations of a work
with harm to the author's reputation, see, e.g., Trib. Seine, Apr. 6, 1842; Trib. Seine, Aug.
17, 1814 (discussed in R. Lindon, supra note 22, at 286-87), Professor Desbois has cautioned
that, under French law, a moral rights claim is not equivalent to a defamation claim. See H.
Desbois, supra note 6, at 1 549. Accord Kayser, Les Droits de la personnaliti, aspects thioriques
etpratiques, 1971 Rev. Tr. Dr. Civ. 445, 475. The latter requires proof of harm; in the case
of the former, once the unauthorized alteration is proved, the author need make no further
showing. Cf. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51(McKinney 1976); (unauthorized publication of name
or image gives rise to an automatic violation; defendant may not escape liability by showing
that the publication did not harm plaintiff's reputation.)
Professor Desbois has indicated that private mutilation of an artwork is a violation of moral
rights, but that the artist's claim does not ripen until the damage is made public. See H.
Desbois, supra note 6, at 1 459 (the owner of a privately displayed artwork which the owner
has mutilated or allowed to deteriorate, should be accountable to the artist "the day when,
desiring to resell the work, he renders its deterioration public").
24. See, e.g., Edelman, Le Droit moral dans les oeuvres artistiques, 1982 D. Chron. 263;
Colombet, note accompanying the decision of the Cour d'appel de Paris, July 10, 1975, 1977
D. Jur. 342. It is generally agreed, however, that the article 32 right to withdraw a work
from publication does not entitle the creator to reclaim from private hands the physical object which incorporates the work. See, e.g., H. Desbois, supra note 6, at 1 412; A. Franon,
La PropriitiLittiraire et Artistique 51 (2d ed. 1979).
25. Edelman, supra note 24, at 263 (emphasis in original).
26. Trib. Gr. Inst. Paris, Mar. 23, 1977, July 1977 RIDA 191, obs. Desbois, aftd, Paris,
June 2, 1978, 1979 D. Jur. 14, note Colombet, [1980] 2 Gaz. Pal. 580, note Franck, rev'd,
Civ. Ire, Jan. 8, 1980, 1980 D. Jur. 89, note Edelman, 1980 J.C.P. II No. 19336, note
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the Dubuffet case, plaintiff artist, invoking the right of integrity and
the right to "divulge" the work, secured an order compelling Renault to complete the erection at its corporate headquarters of a
monumental sculptural group which Renault had commissioned from
plaintiff. In the T.F.1 case, plaintiff authors obtained on the basis of
the same moral rights an order compelling the commissioning party,
a government-owned television station, to complete the filming and
broadcasting of a series of programs written or outlined by plaintiffs.
In both cases, specific performance was awarded despite the presence
of a liquidated damages clause in the applicable contracts, and despite
the general provision of the Civil Code limiting the remedy for contractual nonperformance to an award of damages." In the Dubuffet
case, the decision also imposed two substantial limitations on defendant Renault's property rights. First, Renault was forbidden to destroy the unfinished sculptural group. Second, the compelled erection and maintenance of the monument on Renault's corporate
headquarters had the effect of ordering an encumbrance on Renault's land. Finally, in addition to posing conflicts with contracts and
property rights, the unfinished status of the works at issue also raised
the question of the extent of moral rights protection attaching to unfinished works, and resulted in the articulation of a new moral right:
the right to compel the party commissioning a work of authorship to
complete and make the work known to the public.
This article reviews and analyzes the Dubuffet and T.F.1 decisions.
In discussing the decisions, we will place them in the context of prior
moral rights case law and commentary, and will devote special attention to the tension between moral rights and contract and property
rights. We conclude that despite the apparent, perhaps hermetic,
logic of their results, Dubuffet and T.F. 1 may present a step too far in
the enforcement of creators' moral rights. Indeed, one may well suggest that the creators' victories were too complete: by failing to accommodate the commissioning parties' interests, the courts may have
imposed unrealistic sanctions which may discourage rather than enhance the future prospects of creators of commissioned works.
Lindon, April 1980 RIDA 152, note Franqon, on remand, Versailles, July 8, 1981, Oct.1981
RIDA 201, 1982 D.I.R. 45, obs. Colombet, affd, Civ. Ire, Mar. 16, 1983, July 1983 RIDA
80, 1983 D.I.R. 432.
27. Trib. Gr. Inst., Paris, Dec. 16, 1983, April 1984 RIDA 172, 1984 D.I.R. 287, obs.
Colombet.
28. C. Civ., art. 1142.
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II.

The Saga of the "Salon d'l#t6"

In 1973, the R~gie Renault, France's largest manufacturer of automobiles, commissioned the artist Jean-Philippe Dubuffet to create a
monumental sculpture to be erected on the site of Renault's corporate headquarters outside Paris. Renault intended the sculpture,
which came to be known as the "Salon d't
," for the enjoyment of
its employees and visitors. The contract provided that Dubuffet was

to supply Renault with a model of the sculpture, and with plans and
instructions for erecting the full-scale monument. In the event that
Renault accepted the model, Renault would undertake to build the
monument "on its behalf and on behalf of the artist," ' 9 to pay all
costs of construction, and to adhere to the form, colors, and building
materials selected by Dubuffet. Dubuffet agreed to supply advice toward the satisfactory execution of the full-scale construction.
The contract further provided that Dubuffet was to receive
400,000 francs, 200,000 upon signing, and 200,000 upon delivery of
the model. In the event that Renault did not accept the model, or if
the construction "could not take place"i the contract stipulated by
way of liquidated damages that Dubuffet would retain the 400,000
francs and would seek no further indemnity from Renault.3 0
Dubuffet timely delivered the plans and model, and received the
remaining installment of his fee. The model and plans called for the
construction of a large basin paved with shell-shaped objects, and divided into different levels by benches and sculptures. The entire
monument was to be painted white, with blue or black tracery.
Renault accepted the model and began construction at the end of
1974. By October 1975, an 1800-square meter concrete foundation
had been laid in the courtyard of Renault's headquarters, and a variety of plastic figures had been molded. At this point, Renault determined to cease constructing the monument, claiming that serious
technical difficulties had arisen, that the project had exceeded its
budget, that unexpected delays were prolonging construction beyond
the anticipated date of completion, and that maintenance of the finished monument would require excessive expenditures. 1
In the meantime, Dubuffet, dissatisfied with the subcontractor's execution of the plastic moldings, directed his assistants to see to the
remolding of these elements. Renault's decision to cease construction
29. See July 1983 RIDA, at 85.
30. See July 1977 RIDA, at 192.
31. In addition, between the time of acceptance of the model and the decision to cease
construction, Renault underwent a change of chief executive officers.
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intervened before the sculptures could be remolded. Upon learning
of Renault's decision, Dubuffet offered to contribute up to one million francs toward the cost of construction. He subsequently offered
to pay for all construction costs in excess of the original budget. Renault refused, and announced its determination to destroy the unfinished monument.
Invoking his moral rights of integrity and of "divulgation", Dubuffet commenced an action to compel Renault to complete the monument. The artist located the source of his moral rights in the following sections of the French copyright act: article 1, which provides
that once a work is created its author enjoys various exclusive rights,
including moral rights; article 3, which brings sculptural and architectural works within the subject matter of protection; and article 7,
which states that the work is deemed "created ... by the sole fact of

32
the realization, even incomplete, of the author's conception." As
the holder of moral rights in this unfinished monument, Dubuffet's
argument continued, he was not bound by the liquidated damages
clause because its application would effect an unenforceable waiver of
moral rights. Stripped of its liquidated damages clause, the contract
would leave Renault under a duty to complete the monument. This
contractual duty could not be discharged by an award of damages,
insisted Dubuffet, because only an order of specific performance
would vindicate his right to divulge his work to the public in the
form conceived by the artist.
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, and the Cour d'appel
de Paris, in decisions rendered on January 16, 1976, and June 2,
1978, rejected Dubuffet's claims. Cutting the artist off at the first
step of his argument, both courts determined that Dubuffet was not
the "author" of the partial construction, and therefore could assert
no moral right in the monument. According to these courts, while
Dubuffet was the author of the model, he could not assert authorship
some
of the large-scale work unless he brought to its construction
33
model.
the
of
furnishing
the
beyond
creative contribution
Having excised moral rights from the controversy, the courts faced
a pure contract dispute, which, they concluded, was governed by the

32. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, arts. 1, 3, and 7.
33. Trib. Gr. Inst. Paris, Mar. 23, 1977, July 1977 RIDA 191, 193, Paris, June 2, 1978,
1979 D. Jur. 14, 15. The Cour d'appel de Paris stated that Dubuffet's role in the erection of
the monument "did not give him the opportunity sufficiently to impress his creative personality on the work, or did not involve a manifestation of his personality in the course of the
execution of the work." In support of this view, the court emphasized that Dubuffet had
delegated the task of overseeing the remolding of the plastic figures to his assistants.
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liquidated damages clause. Although the clause did not expressly
cover the event that Renault would accept the model, begin construction, and then determine to stop, the courts concluded that, absent
language to the contrary, Renault's right to refrain from construction in the first place comprehended the right to cease construction
once begun.
On January 8, 1980, the Cour de cassation reversed the moral
rights ground of decision, and remanded for reconsideration of the
application of the contract. The High Court rejected the lower
courts' separation of the authorship of the model and the unfinished
monument. The court declared, "The author of an original model,
according to which the monumental sculpture is built, is the holder
of a moral right in the latter to the extent that the sculpture owes its
originality to the model and realizes the conception of its author;
therefore, in denying Dubuffet all moral right in the incomplete construction of the 'Salon d'Et6' on the sole ground that he had not
brought any additional contribution beyond the model, the court of
appeals had no legal basis for its decision.""
On remand to the Cour d'Appel de Versailles," Dubuffet obtained
a decision ordering Renault to recommence and complete construction of the monument. Following the indications of the Cour de Cassation, the court of appeals on July 7, 1981, determined that Dubuffet's authorship extended not merely to the model, but to the
monumental sculpture: Renault had, after all, engaged Dubuffet to
create a monument, of which the model was merely the necessary
first draft. The court distinguished the analysis pertinent to a pure
contract dispute from the analysis applicable to a contract whose subject matter enjoys moral rights protection. As a matter of general
contract law, the court stated, the commissioning party might well
maintain that the contractual right initially to refrain from construction comprehended the right to cease construction once undertaken.
Where, however, the commissioned work is protected by the authors'
rights act, the rights granted by that law, and the public policy underlying moral rights, supercede traditional contract rights. Thus,
once the artist's moral rights are at issue, the commissioning party no
34. Civ. Ire, Jan. 8, 1980, Apr. 1980 RIDA 152, 154.
35. According to French appellate procedure, if the Cour de cassation reverses an appellate court's decision, the remand is almost always directed to an appellate court other than
the court which decided the first appeal. See generally R. David, French Law (1972), excerpted in J. Merryman & D. Clark , Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal Systems 257, 271 (1978).
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longer maintains sole control over the fate of the work, for the artist
may invoke his moral rights in the work to prevent its destruction.
The court then emphasized that the contract provided that upon
acceptance of the model Renault would undertake to build the monument "on its behalf and on behalf of the artist". Thus, deemed the
court, Renault had in fact acknowledged and adopted Dubuffet's continuing interest in the construction of the monument. That interest
could only be fulfilled by the completion of the large-scale work. Correspondingly, Renault would be entitled to cease construction only if
circumstances beyond Renault's control (force majeure) prevented the
work's completion.
Unhappy with the court of appeals' interpretation of the contract,
Renault appealed to the Cour de cassation. That court, on March
16th, 1983, in the final judicial decision of the controversy, affirmed.
Observing that the contract did not specifically prescribe the rights
of the parties in the event that Renault accepted the model, began
construction, but subsequently decided to stop, the High Court approved the Cour d'Appel de Versailles' resolution of the contract's
ambiguity in favor of Dubuffet. Thus, the court confirmed the narrow reading of the contract which recognized Renault's right not to
commence construction, but which held Renault under a duty to
complete construction once commenced.
Renault also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the force
of the artist's moral rights.Renault contended that moral rights protect only the incorporeal rights in a work of authorship, and therefore could not impose a duty of preservation on the owner of the
physical object.36 Such a duty, maintained Renault, would violate the
owner's civil law right to enjoy and dispose of his property. Moreover, enforcement of the duty would in effect make Dubuffet the
beneficiary of a servitude on Renault's land, for Renault's land would
be encumbered with the unwanted statue which Renault would be
obliged, at great expense, to preserve and maintain. Finally,Renault
argued that the order to complete construction violated the article of
the Civil Code which declares that an award of damages discharges
contractual nonperformance .

7

36. Renault derived this argument from the Cour de cassation's decision of Dec. 3, 1968,
1969 D. Jur. 73, concl. Lindon, which rejected the moral rights claim of an artist who contended that a dealer had "dumped" his paintings on the market, thus lowering their value
and injuring his artistic reputation. While the case essentially involved a pecuniary dispute,
the High Court stated that the right of integrity "protects only the author's incorporeal
property rights." See generally Fran~on, supra note 23, Jan. 1977 RIDA, at 120.
37. C. civ., art 1142 states, "Any obligation to act or to refrain from acting will be re-
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The High Court, like the lower court, disposed of these contentions by observing that Renault was not prevented by force majeure
from completing the work, and by referring to Renault's contractual
agreement to build the monument "on its behalf and on behalf of the
artist." Thus, the impact on Renault's land notwithstanding, Renault
"put itself under the contractual obligation to execute
the work
through to completion-in such a way as to comply fully with the
moral right of the artist which Renault had adopted as its own interest, and therefore, above all, to permit the work to be divulged-and
therefore Renault may not unilaterally interrupt the execution of its
contractual obligation.""8
Although moral rights controversies between artists and parties
commissioning the creation of artistic works are not new to French
jurisprudence,39 Dubuffet presented the first case to result in an order
compelling the commissioning party to complete and, implicitly, to
preserve an unwanted artwork. The commissioning party's role in
the construction of the work brought special complications to the
case. As a result of that role, the courts, for the first time, squarely
confronted the problem of determining whether the artist who supplies the model or instructions for a work executed by another must
be deemed the "author" of the executed work. In past cases, the
courts appear simply to have assumed that the author of a model or
solved by an award of damages in the event of the debtor's nonexecution [of the
obligation]."
38. Civ. Ire, Mar. 16, 1983, July 1983 RIDA 80, 85.
39. See, e.g., Paris, July 4, 1865, [1865] 2 D.P. 201, [1865] 2 S. 233, Civ. Ire,
Mar. 14,
1900, [19001 1 D.P. 497, report Rau, concl. Desjardins, note Planiol (both upholding
artists'
refusals to complete or deliver commissioned artworks. The artists involved were
Rosa Bonheur and James MacNeil Whistler. In Whistler's case, the artist had a falling-out
with his
client, and painted over the face of the subject of the commissioned portrait.); Conseil
d'ttat,
Apr. 3, 1936, [1936] 3 D. 57, concl. Josse, note Waline, Conseil Prefecture Montpellier,
Dec.
9, 1936; [1937] 1 Gaz. Pal. 34 (action by sculptor of statue acommissioned by
municipality
against municipality for having allowed the statue to deteriorate); Trib. Admin.
Grenoble,
Feb. 18, 1976, Jan. 1977 RIDA 116, note Franoon (action by sculptor objecting
to commissioning municipality's removal of sculpture from public park); Paris, July 10, 1975,
1977 D.
Jur. 342, note Colombet, Jan. 1977 RIDA 114, note Fran~on (action by sculptor
against owners of shopping center who, without the artist's knowledge or permission, removed
the commissioned sculpture from the shopping center). See also Riom, Mar. 26, 1966, 1967
J.C.P. II
No. 15183 note Bourgisot (action by architect against client who, without architect's
knowledge or authorization, subsequently erected an architecturally unharmonious
annex to the
architectural complex designed by plaintiff); Compare Paris, Nov. 25, 1980, Apr.
1981 RIDA
162 (sculpture commissioned for church mutilated by angry parish priest and
parishioners
who found the work blasphemous), with Trib. Civ. Versailles, June 23, 1932, 1932
D.H. 487;
Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, 1934 D.H. 385 ("l'affaire des 'Fresques deJuivisy' ") (claim
by artist of
frescoes commissioned for church chapel against church authorities who subsequently
plastered over the frescoes rejected on the ground that the commissioning party,
a local parish
priest, had not obtained episcopal authorization for the commission).
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of the instructions for executing a work was also the, or at least an,
author of the resulting final version.4
The commissioning party's role also qualified Dubuffet as the first
case in which the artist, rather than the commissioning party, sought
the completion and "divulgation" of an unfinished work. In the past,
artists had prevailed in their refusals to complete, deliver, or "divulge" a commissioned work with which the artist had become disenchanted."1 In Dubuffet, by contrast, the artist desired the work's
completion, but encountered the refusal of the commissioning party
charged with the ultimate execution of the work.
The final holdings entail several novel or significant consequences.First, the decision represents the most extensive encroachment of moral rights on property rights to date. Dubuffet was the first
moral rights case to order an immediate restraint on the prerogatives
of a property owner. In prior jurisprudence, when courts found that
the property owner had violated the artist's moral rights by destroying or mutilating the work, the artist's sole remedy was in damages.
Thus, in a well-known case involving a sculptural fountain erected in
a shopping center, the artist received damages, but was not granted
the further requested relief of an order compelling the owners of the
shopping center to replace the fountain which they had removed."
The one previous exception to the limitation of the relief to damages
48
was the even better known "refrigerator of Bernard Buffet" case.
There, artist Bernard Buffet had painted the several sides of a refrigerator as a contribution to a charity auction. The purchaser, perceiving that upon resale he would receive a greater return if the panels
of the refrigerator were sold separately, dismembered the refrigerator. Buffet's suit against the owner for violation of Buffet's right of
integrity resulted in an award of damages, and in an order forbidding
the owner from reselling the work as separate panels. The owner's
enjoyment of the work, whether as a unit or as separate panels, how40. See, e.g., Riom, Mar. 26, 1966, supra note 39 (architect's claim of moral right in
architectural complex upheld without inquiry regarding whether the architect participated in
the erection of the buildings); Civ. Ire, Nov. 13, 1973, 1974 D. Jur. 53 note Colombet, 1975
J.C.P. II No. 18029, note Magnine (action by sculptor to be declared the co-author of sculptures created according to the designs and oral instructions of Renoir; Renoir's authorship of
the sculptures not questioned); Limoges, May 31, 1976, Oct. 1976 RIDA 173, 1976 Rev. Tr.
Dr. Com. 140, obs. Desbois (weaver's claim of co-authorship of tapestry executed from
cartoons drawn by defendant artist rejected; artist held sole "author" of the tapestry).
41. See Paris, July 4, 1865, supra note 39; Civ., Mar. 14, 1900, supra note 39.
42. Paris, July 10, 1975, supra note 39.
43. Paris, May 30, 1962, 1962 D. Jur. 570 note Desbois, 1963 J.C.P. II No. 12989, obs.
Savatier, Civ., July 6, 1965, 1965 J.C.P. II No. 14339.
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ever, was not disturbed. The injunction was to take effect only at
such time as the owner sought to dispose of the work.4 4
The High Court's affirmance of the Dubuffet injunction implies not
only an immediate, but a continuing interference with Renault's
property rights. Although the Cour de cassation did not explicitly address the question, it would appear that once completed, not only
would the sculpture remain on Renault's land, the sculpture would
have to be maintained. Indeed, Renault had contended that it should
not be obliged to complete the sculpture because the monument's
subsequent upkeep would require great expense. The Cour de cassation's dismissal of Renault's argument therefore may suggest that the
duties which the creator's moral rights impose upon property owners
include an affirmative obligation of upkeep. It may seem obvious that
a duty to complete a work comprehends a duty to ensure the work's
preservation, for if the artist's moral right is violated by leaving the
work in an unfinished state, the right must be equally violated if the
owner allows the work to deteriorate. Nonetheless, while lower
courts had in the past occasionally intimated a duty to preserve
artworks against deterioration, the intimations occurred in the context of works which had already been destroyed or allowed to deteriorate.'" Since the works at issue were already damaged beyond repair, the duty to preserve arose only as an element of liability for past
conduct. The property owners thus did not incur a continuing obligation to maintain the works.Dubuffet by contrast, for the first time implicated the property owner's actual and prospective duty to
preserve.
With respect to its impact on contract rights, Dubuffet both confirms prior doctrine and effects a new twist. The Cour de cassation's
adoption of the Cour de Versailles' treatment of the Dubuffet-Renault contract appears to establish the rule that once construction of
a commissioned work places the artist's moral right at stake, any contractual provisions pointing toward waiver of moral rights must be
read narrowly, and any ambiguities must be interpreted against the
44. We note, however, that the Buffet defendant's enjoyment of the refrigerator panels
was most likely left undisturbed because the dismembered refrigerator would have remained
in private possession and would not have been publicly displayed. Had the work been on
public view, the owner would probably have been obliged immediately to reassemble the
work.
45. See, e.g., Conseil d'tat, Apr. 3, 1936, supra note 39; Paris, July 10, 1975, supra note
39; Paris, Nov. 25, 1980, supra note 39.
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the
commissioning party. In this regard, Dubuffet appears to restate
4"
rights.
view of the commentators concerning waivers of moral
By contrast, Dubuffet's award of specific performance against the
commissioning party represents a new development in the relationship between moral rights and contract rights. The decision yields an
imbalance of remedies with regard to contractual nonperformance.
On the one hand, it is well established that the commissioning party
cannot compel the breaching artist to complete and deliver a commissioned work.' 7 Such a remedy would violate the artist's moral
right to determine whether or not to divulge the work. In addition,
the remedy would contravene article 1142 of the Civil Code, which
limits the remedy for contractual nonperformance to an award of
damages. On the other hand, and despite article 1142, it now appears
that the artist can compel the commissioning party to execute its contractual obligations, because nonexecution leaves the work incomplete, thus depriving the artist of the right to divulge and to ensure
the integrity of the work.
Are these results justified? Arguably, all proceed logically, if not
inexorably, from the conclusion that Dubuffet was the author of, and
therefore enjoyed moral rights in the unfinished construction. This
conclusion, standing alone, seems eminently sensible. The holding
finds support in the French authors' rights act, which lists among
protected works not only architectural plans, sketches, and models,
48
but also architectural works. Thus, according to the act's drafters,
there is a provision for copyright protection both of plans, and of the
constructions built from them. If the constructions are protected, the
question then arises as to who is the copyright owner of the constructions. The most logical solution is to say that the "author" of the
construction is none other than the author of the plans which provided the basis for the construction. Indeed, no one else could lay
better claim to its authorship. Thus, for example, under French law,
one would not think of calling the "authors" of a building the stone
50
masons who built it, 49 or the party who paid for the work. Once the
46.. See R. Plaisant, supra note 20, at 1 64.
47. See decisions cited supra note 41; Fran~on, obs. 1984 Rev. Tr. Dr. Com. 284, 286.
48. Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 3.
49. Cf. Edelman, note accompanying report of the Cour de Cassation's first decision in
Dubuffet, 1980 D. Jur. 89, 90 (raising and rejecting the authorship of the stone masons); Trib.
Gr. Inst., Paris, July 6, 1976, 1976 RIDA No. LXL at 190 ("author" of a photogragh held to
be the person who prepares the composition of the shot, not the person who simply depresses
the button controlling the shutter.)
50. Cf. Colombet, note accompanying the decision of the Cour d'appel de Paris in Dubuffet, 1979 D. Jur. 14, 16 (raising and rejecting the financier's "authorship"). American readers
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author of the model is recognized as the author of the full-scale
work, it is appropriate to attribute to him, as did the Cour de cassation, moral rights in the construction. And by virtue of the protection of unfinished works, the author of the model enjoys these moral
rights whether or not the construction is completed.
Once it is determined that the artist enjoys moral rights in the unfinished construction, must it follow that the artist has the right to
compel the commissioning party to complete and maintain the work?
Arguably, given the inalienable and indefeasible character of moral
rights, no other result would comport with the artist's rights, for only
an order of specific performance against the co-contractant and property owner would ensure the integrity of the work and would permit
the work to be divulged in the form conceived by its creator. Thus,
at least according to this theory, any contract or property-based obstacles to the exercise of the moral right must give way.
The Cour de cassation did not go that far. Indeed, having articulated the existence of Dubuffet's moral right in the monument, the
High Court was able to enforce the moral right to the utmost while
claiming to avoid any contract or property conflicts. A clause in Renault's agreement with Dubuffet supplied the panacea: since Renault
had undertaken to build the monument "on its behalf and on behalf
of the artist,"'" Renault was deemed to have adopted Dubuffet's
moral right, and therefore to have acquiesced in its enforcement.
Ironically, while Renault had attempted to hold Dubuffet to a waiver
of his moral rights through the liquidated damages clause, the courts
ultimately determined that the "on behalf of the artist" clause acted
as a kind of waiver of Renault's contract and property-based
objections.
This convenient peculiarity in the Renault-Dubuffet contract does
not, however, mean that the decision can be limited to its facts. The
should be aware that the 1957 French authors' rights law has virtually no provision for
"works made for hire", cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (1976). Article 1 of
the French authors'
rights act explicitly states that an employment contract in no way derogates from the author's
right to initial ownership of his work. In addition, in France, the "author" of a copyrighted
work must be a physical person: corporations thus are precluded from initial copyright
ownwership. See generally Fran~on, supra note 24, at 27-28. An exception to this rule is
contained in article 13 of the law of March 11, 1957, which provides that the initial copyright
owner of a collective work (such as a newspaper, encyclopedia, or anthology) is the "person,
physical or moral, under whose name the work is made public," and who coordinates the
work's creation. In addition, articles 45 and 46 of the law of July 3, 1985, amending and
amplifying the authors' rights law of 1957, establish a special work for hire-like regime with
respect to ownerhsip of computer programs.
51. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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decision indicated the scope of moral rights enforcement in the essentially contrived absence of an explicit contract or property conflict. We postpone our assessment of the wisdom of such extensive
enforcement until after a description and discussion of the case which
followed, and extended, Dubuffet.
III. The Affaire T.F.1
On January 26th, 1981, one of France's three government-owned
television channels entered into two identical contracts with the authors Michel Droit and Ren6 Huygue commissioning scripts for thirteen forty-minute programs comprising a series titled "Precursors
and Masters of Modern Painting." The authors were to deliver the
thirteen episodes in four installments. Clause 7 of each contract stipulated the compensation the authors were to receive if the scripts were
delivered in accordance with the contract, and if T.F.1 accepted the
scripts. The clause further provided that if T.F. 1 failed to broadcast
the accepted programs within three years, T.F.1 would lose the exclusive right to broadcast the programs, the authors would keep the
sums paid, and the authors would have no other indemnity or claim
against T.F.1. To bring the project to fruition, it was necessary for
T.F.1 to enter into various further contracts with producers, directors, and production personnel.
All went well for the first four episodes, which the authors timely
delivered and which T.F. 1 accepted, produced, and broadcast. From
that point on, however, T.F.1 refused to continue its execution of
the contracts, asserting that its new program schedule accomodated
only 26-minute time blocks, and that the forty-minute programs,
therefore, could not be broadcast. The authors offered to revise
their scripts, but T.F.1 eventually refused.
Messrs. Huygue and Droit then commenced an action against
T.F. 1 before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. Relying on
article 7 of the French authors' rights law, which brings unfinished
52
works within the subject matter of protection, the plaintiffs demanded that T.F.1 be ordered to complete the production and
broadcast of the series, as provided in the contracts. T.F.1 disputed
the application of article 7 to the facts of the case. T.F. 1 asserted that
the authors had limited themselves to setting forth general ideas concerning the remaining episodes. Because ideas are not protected,"
52. Law of Mar. 11, 1957 states that the work is "deemed created ... by the sole fact of
the realization, even incomplete, of the author's conception."
53. See generally H. Desbois. supra note 6, at 22-39. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
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maintained T.F. 1, the authors had no claim under the authors' rights
act.
In a judgment dated December 14, 1983, the court ordered T.F.1
to complete its execution of the contracts. The court's decision addresses both the protection accorded unfinished works, and the imposition of the remedy of specific performance on the commissioning
party. With regard to the protection of unfinished works, the court
analyzed in detail the content of the proposal which the authors had
submitted to T.F.1 and which had served as the basis for the contracts. The judges concluded that the proposal went beyond the furnishing of mere ideas. "After having selected the materials necessary
to render concrete their ideas for the series," the court stated, "[the
authors of the proposal] set forth the general plan of the series.""
Thus, in the court's view, the proposal revealed the "conception" of
an original work of authorship within the meaning of article 7. Moreover, continued the court, "the realization of this conception" had
commenced because "the first four programs of the series were [not
only written, but] even broadcast." 5 T.F.1 had attempted to defeat
this approach by pointing out that the scripts for the nine unbroadcast episodes had not been delivered to T.F.1. In effect, T.F.1 contended that each episode was a distinct work. The court, however,
deemed that the thirteen episodes constituted a single work.
Regarding the parties' contract rights, the court observed that
neither force majeure nor the fault of the authors occasioned T.F. l's
decision to refrain from producing and broadcasting the remaining
nine programs. The court rejected T.F.1's claim that its right to reject the programs comprehended the right to cease broadcasting the
series. On the contrary, stated the court, the right to reject applied
only to individual program scripts; "it did not entitle T.F. 1 to refrain
from completing the execution of the work [the series] which it had
commissioned." 5 6 The court read the contract as a whole to manifest
T.F. l's intention and commitment to produce the series. Thus, once
T.F.1 began to produce and broadcast the work, it "thereby placed
itself under the contractual obligation to execute the work through
to completion, and therefore could not unilaterally interrupt its discharge of that duty." '57 Finally, the court determined that since the
work of authorship at issue could only be broadcast by government54.
55.
56.
57.

Trib. Gr. Inst. Paris, Dec. 14, 1983, April 1983 RIDA 172, 175.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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owned television stations, given the government's monopoly on the
airwaves, T.F.1 could not discharge its nonperformance by payment
of damages without violating the authors' moral right to have their
work divulged. Accordingly, the court ordered T.F. 1 to produce and
broadcast the remainder of the series in compliance with the contracts. An appeal to the Cour d'appel de Paris is pending.
The court's disposition of all three questions in the case seems
rather dubious. With respect to the identification of the "work" giving rise to moral rights protection, the court's determination that the
four broadcast programs constituted portions of a single work sufficiently evidenced by the precontractual proposal, appears somewhat
strained. Although Dubuffet evidently inspired the T.F.1 court's ruling, the analogy between the two cases seems tenuous. Granted, the
subject of the T.F. 1 agreement was not isolated programs, but a complete series, just as the Dubuffet parties contracted not for a model,
but for a monument. In Dubuffet, however, the Cour de cassation
held the artist entitled to a moral right in the unfinished monument
because the monument reflected the conception of the model. The
model represented a complete evocation of the form of the large
scale work: Dubuffet essentially confined his creative efforts to the
execution of the model. In T.F.1, the court stated that the program
proposal evidenced the authors' "conception," of which the first four
programs were a partial realization. The program proposal, however,
unlike Dubuffet's model, did not afford a complete evocation of the
authors' creation. Unlike Dubuffet, the T.F.1 authors did not complete their artistic task with the submission of the proposal. Thus,
both the program proposal and the first four programs were incomplete manifestations of the "work" of the series. Arguably, if the copyright act protects unfinished works, it should not matter that the
authors never supplied a fully articulated conception of the series.
Indeed, according to the court's logic, it would appear that the outline of the series alone afforded sufficient foundation for the authors'
moral right. Nonetheless, it seems a bold proposition to ground so
powerful a right in a largely unelaborated outline for a yet-to-be-created work.
The court's reading of the contract displays even more audacity. In
the wake of Dubuffet, the T.F.1 court interpreted the commissioning
party's right of rejection in the most restrictive light conceivable.
The court's construction of the contract, however, goes beyond
Dubuffet in two respects. First, given the nature of the "work" at issue, the court's articulation of a duty to execute seems inherently unlikely. In Dubuffet, the commissioning party had accepted a fully exe-

19851

AUTHORS' RIGHTS IN FRANCE

cuted model and instructions. The commissioning party thus
undertook to build the work knowing what the work would look like
and what its construction would entail. According to the T.F. 1 court's
interpretation of the contract, by contrast, the commissioning party
irrevocably bound itself to produce and broadcast an entire 13-program series, even though it had not accepted, or even received, over
two-thirds of the scripts.
Second, unlike Dubuffet, the T.F. 1 court's interpretation of the contract did not arise from a highly literal reading of the liquidated damages clause. In Dubuffet, the Cour d'appel de Versailles and the Cour
de cassation rejected the implication of a right to cease construction.
Their literal reading of the clause may have deformed the parties'
intentions, and may have lacked common sense, but it was faithful to
the letter of the document. In T.F.1, by contrast, the court of first
instance effectively rewrote the key clause of the contract. In holding
T.F. 1 to a duty to produce and broadcast the entire series, the court
interpreted the right conferred by the liquidated damages clause to
reject individual programs as a prerogative separate from the duty to
broadcast. The liquidated damages clause, however, at least as described in the court's report of the facts, 58 combined the right to reject individual programs with the right to determine whather or not
to broadcast the series as whole. According to the clause, T.F. 1 did
not explicitly undertake to broadcast the entire series. Rather, T.F.1
acquired an exclusive three-year option to broadcast whichever programs it accepted.59 Moreover, the T.F. 1 contract, far from containing Dubuffet's fatal "on behalf of the artist" clause, explicitly provided
that in the event of T.F. I's failure to broadcast the accepted programs within three years, that the authors would seek no other indemnity beyond the sums received and would forego any claims
against T.F. 1.
T.F.1, then, vividly illustrates how the presence of a moral rights
interest may provoke judicial deformation of a contract commissioning the creation of a work of authorship. The court's labored construction of the contract advances, rather than obstructs the authors'
interest in seeing their work broadcast, and achieves the same result
as if the court had simply nullified the liquidated damages clause as
an unenforceable waiver of moral rights. Since invalidation of the
58. Because evidence submitted at trial in France does not become public record, the
authors of this comment were unable to consult the actual text of the T.F.1 contract.
59. Of course, if T.F.I exercised its undiputed right to reject individual program scripts,
T.F.I would not end up producing and broadcasting and "entire" series of 13 programs.
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clause would have afforded a simpler resolution of the controversy,
one may inquire why the court did not follow that route.
Two responses come to mind. First, the court's apparent effort to
avoid a moral rights/contract rights conflict may suggest that not all
waivers of moral rights are invalid. Perhaps, as some commentators
have contended, narrowly-defined waivers of moral rights may in fact
be enforceable. 60 The absence of recent case law regarding that issue, 61 and the failure of either the Dubuffet or T.F.1 courts to find a
waiver in the respective contracts leaves the matter unresolved. Second, and perhaps more probably, the T.F.1 court may have declined
to find a waiver of moral rights because, at least as of the time of the
formation of the T.F. 1 contract, no court had announced a moral
right to compel the commissioning party to complete and divulge a
work of authorship. In other words, if the right did not then exist,
the contract could not have contemplated its waiver. Moreover, while
the liquidated damages clause proscribed any copyright action by the
authors against T.F. 1, the proscription may have been too general to
meet the principle that, if moral rights can be waived at all, any
waiver must be precisely and restrictively stated.
Turning to the third element of the court's decision, the court's
imposition of an order to complete and broadcast the author's work
presents a further extension of the Dubuffet result. Dubuffet concerned artistic works, a subject matter in which the physical object
assumes a special importance, for the object itself may be of great
value, and it is directly through the medium of the physical object
that the public encounters the artist's conception. The special quality
of the physical object as the source of direct communication between
the artist and his public may supply a rationale for compelling the
commissioning party to complete the work: destruction or incompletion of the object deprives the artist both of his or her creative voice
and of his or her public.
In T.F.1, by contrast, the commissioning party had contracted to
produce an audiovisual work. The physical copy of such a work no
longer represents the essential aspects of the scriptwriters' endeavor.
The communication of the work to the public is no longer achieved
60. See R. Plaisant, supra note 20, at 64.
61. French caselaw has, however, recently reaffirmed the principle that general waivers of
moral rights are void. See Trib. Gr. Inst. Paris, Dec. 1, 1983, April 1984 RIDA 161, 165
(authors of an animated cartoon who granted rights to adapt the cartoon into a comic strip
held to have conditioned the grant on the observance of their moral rights. In an aside, the
court stated that even were defendants correct that the contract waived the authors' moral
rights, the waiver would be void.)
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through the direct contact of the public with the physical copy, but
by the exercise of the monopoly on televised performances. Arguably, that monopoly confronted the T.F. I authors with a dilemma similar to that of the creator of an unwanted commissioned artwork.
Without alternative broadcast outlets, the authors' work could not
reach the television-viewing public. 2 The essential difference, however, remains in the nature of the work. While the physical artwork is
a unitary work from which a single creator communicates directly
with the public, a television script is only an element of the audiovisual work. In order to bring the T.F.1 authors' conception to the
televison-viewing public, it would be necessary to create a further
work incorporating the script. The resulting audiovisual work would
be the product of many statutorily-protected authors, all of whom
would have brought creative contributions to the work." Thus, enforcement of the scriptwriters' moral right through the remedy of
specific performance requires the unwilling commissioning party to
engage the services of the other authors needed for the production
of an audiovisual work, and to produce and broadcast the work over
a long period. Imposition of a remedy mandating the participation of
so many further contributors and whose enforcement extends over
many months, seems particularly unwise.4
Returning to the Dubuffet decision, we observe that the remedy
there also imposed a burden of continuing performance, indeed, over
a potentially perpetual period. Does the special nature of physical
artworks justify this result? We point out that the arguments rehearsed above only apply to artworks displayed in a public place, or
at least in a place to which members of the public are invited. If the
work is destined for purely private enjoyment, the artist should not
be entitled to compel the work's completion, for it is generally
agreed that the artist's ability to enforce his interest in the integrity
62. See Colombet, 1984 D.I.R. 287. One should note, however, that France has three
other television channels. In addition, the scriptwriters could make their ideas and arguments
known to the public by converting their scripts into a book. Thus, T.F.I's decision would not
have completely disabled the plaintiffs from disseminating their message.
63. See Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 18; H. Desbois, supra note 6, at 165.
64. One might observe that had the commissioning party been an individual, rather than
a corporation, the court would most likely not have imposed a remedy requiring the commissioning party to create and broadcast an audiovisual work based on plaintiffs' script. Had the
remedy required an individual defendant to act in the capacity of an author, the remedy
would have contravened the principle that an author may not be compelled to create, complete, or disclose a work. See supra note 41. This principle, which derives from the moral
right to divulge or refrain from divulging a work of authorship, however, does not apply to
corporations, for moral rights have a strictly personal character. See law of Mar. 11, 1957,
art. 1; Colombet, supra note 6 at 136.
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6
of his work depends upon the work's public exposure. Dubuffet's
6
monument, however, met the criterion of public accessibility."
Nonetheless, while the arguments regarding the special nature of
physical artworks evoke sympathy for the remedy of specific performance against an unwilling co-contractant and property owner,
the relief imposed is not only extremely burdensome, but, we would
suggest, ultimately unrealistic. Indeed, one may well inquire whether,
from the creator's point of view, it is in fact desirable to compel the
commissioning party's performance. In this respect, one cannot be
but struck by the epilogue of the Dubuffet case. At the end of the
proceedings, the artist declined to seek enforcement of the judgment
in his favor. "It displeases me," he stated in announcing his decision,
"to compel the execution of a work in a place where it has been so
ill-treated." He added that the execution of a work conceived for the
enjoyment of a corporation "makes no sense unless the work is
warmly desired. The work loses its meaning if it is completed in indifference, indeed, hostility." 67

65. See supra note 23.
66. Renault intended the sculpture for the enjoyment of Renault's employees and visitors.
67. J.-P. Dubuffet, remarks published in La Propriiti Artistique, Nos. 7-8, June-October
1983.
Although the issue did not arise in the Dubuffet case, American readers may wish to know
how Dubuffet could have ensured enforcement of the order of specific performance. A
French plaintiff who fears the losing defendant's recalcitrance may request that the court
pronounce its order sous astreinte. (The court may also order an astreinte sua sponte.) An astreinte is a court order which obliges the defendant to pay a designated sum, generally in per
diem installments, to the plaintiff until the defendant complies with the judgment. See Law of
July 3, 1972, 1972 D.L. 321. Plaintiff does not, however, collect the sums until the astreinte
has been "liquidated." Liquidation may occur when the defendant performs, or when plaintiff demonstrates that defendant is persisting in its nonperformance. In the latter event, the
court may order defendant to pay the full amount of the designated penalty, and may fix a
new astreinte at a higher figure. See, e.g., Civ., Oct. 20, 1959, 1959 D. Jur. 537, note Holleaux (five increasingly higher astreintes imposed). See generally J. Carbonnier, 4 Droit Civil
604-10 (1982); 0. Kahn-Freund, C. Lbvy; B. Rudden, A Source Book on French Law 520-31
(1979).
Mr. Dubuffet has since encountered further difficulties concerning the execution and public display of his monumental sculptures in*France. The latest event in the history of the
artist's travails centers on a monumental sculpture commissioned by the French government,
and designated for construction in a state-owned park outside of Paris. The mayor of the
suburb in which the park is located objected to the erection of the monument, and the
French government has sought other sites. The potential alternative sites have all so far
proved impractical, or have been rejected by the artist. The project has therefore, at least for
the moment, reached a standstill. See Le Monde, Dec. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 3, 20, col. 1; see also
Le Monde, Jan. 13-14, 1985, at 11, col. 1. At present, none of Mr. Dubuffet's monumental
sculptures have been erected in France. One of his monumental works, however, stands
outside the Chase Manhattan Bank building in the Wall Street area of New York City.

19851
IV.

AUTHORS' RIGHTS IN FRANCE

403

A Moral Right to Compel the Completion and Divulgation of A
Commissioned Work?

We have reviewed the practical and common sense objections to
enforcement of a moral right to compel the completion and divulgation of a commissioned work. These objections raise the question
whether the theoretical bases for the right are in fact sound. The
argument in favor of the right rests on a conjunctive reading of various provisions of the French copyright act. According to that act,
unfinished works are considered works of authorship.6 Works of authorship receive moral rights protection, which includes protection
of the work's integrity, and a guarantee of the right to make the
work known to the public.60 Accordingly, unfinished works are entitled to these same rights. The creator therefore has the right to
make an unfinished work public. If, however, the work is made public in its unfinished state, the argument continues, the work will not
accurately reveal its creator's conception. Divulgation of the work in
an unfinished state would thus violate the right of integrity. In order
to satisfy both the rights of integrity and of divulgation, therefore,
the work must be both completed and made public. 70
This argument, however, may go several steps too far. Granting
the proposition that unfinished works under the French copyright act
are entitled to all the protections accorded finished works, it does not
follow that they are entitled to further protections. A right to complete a work is not one of the rights accorded finished works. Accordingly, if unfinished works are assimilated to finished works, there
can be no right to complete an unfinished work. The rights of divulgation and integrity, or, in the words of the statute, "to have the
work be respected," apply to the work in its unfinished state. The
unfinished work may be made public as is, and once made public may
not be destroyed or diminished, but neither may the creator compel
that there be additions to the work. The right to have the work be
respected applies to what its creator has already done, not to what he
has yet to do.
One may object that this interpretation is highly formalistic, and
that the right to divulge an unfinished work is in most cases no right
at all, for creators are unlikely to desire the public exposure of works
which do not accurately convey the creators' conceptions. Nonethe68.
69.
70.
June 2,

Law of Mar. 11, 1957, art. 7.
Law of Mar. 11, 1957, arts. 6, 19.
See, e.g., Colombet, note accompanying the decision of the Cour d'appel de Paris,
1978, 1979 D. Jur. 14, 15-17.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ART AND THE LAW

[Vol. 9:381

less, the French authors' rights act's assimilation of unfinished works
to finished works strongly indicates that the drafters of the law
neither envisioned nor intended a right to complete, or to compel
the completion of, an unfinished work. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
legislative history regarding the French authors' rights act of 1957
reveals no discussion of a right to complete an unfinished work.7 1 Articulation of such a right thus rests on an extension of the statutorily
granted rights. In the apparent absence of legislative intent to confer
such a right, we would suggest that the Dubuffet and T.F.1 courts
should not have been so quick to pronounce its existence, or at least
to enforce it through an award of specific performance. Indeed, the
practical problems attending the right's enforcement should counsel
judicial hesitation in future cases involving unfinished commissioned
7

works.

2

Finally, while the burdens attending enforcement of a moral right
to complete and divulge an unfinished work are greatest when the
commissioning party bears responsibility for the work's ultimate execution, we would also contend that even where the artist is in a position to complete the work himself, it is inappropriate to recognize
and enforce a moral right to complete and divulge a commissioned
work. If, for example, Renault had commissioned a painting to hang
in the reception area of its corporate headquarters, and subsequently
decided to cancel the commission, the artist should not be able to
compel Renault to permit him to complete the work and to display it
in Renault's headquarters.
We reach this conclusion not only because we doubt that the
French statute on authors' rights provides such a right, but, more
fundamentally, because we believe that recognition and enforcement
of the right tilts the law of author's rights too far toward creators of
works of authorship. The terms of the French statute and particularly its moral rights provisions, already afford what my well be the
71. The Assemblie Nationale adopted article 7 of the authors' rights law of 1957 without
discussion. See J.O. Ass. Nat. 1427, Apr. 2, 1956. A member of the Conseil de la Republique
inquired when the unfinished work protected by article 7 would have reached a sufficient
stage of development to be considered a "work;" the reporter for the bill replied that it was a
question for determination on a case-by-case basis. Article 7 was then adopted without further discussion. See J.O. Cons. Rep. 2152, Oct. 31, 1956.
72. The American reader should note that the decisions of French courts, including those
of the highest civil court, the Cour de cassation, are not binding precedent. See, e.g., C. civ.
art. 5; deVries, Civil Law and the Anglo-American Lawyer 289-91 (1976). Nonetheless, lower
courts in fact generally decide cases in a manner consistent with the decisions of the Cour de
cassation, and the High Court generally adheres to its own pronouncements.
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maximum accommodation of creators' interests tolerable, given the
current economic, social and cultural state of affairs in France.73
In any system for the protection of authors' rights, there is a tension between the rights of creators and those of users of protected
works. In a system such as the French regime, which accords broad
recognition to moral as well as economic rights, the tension is all the
more heightened. If the rights of creators in France are generally
respected, that is because the author's rights realistically reflect the
extent of the limitations on their use of protected works to which
French consumers of works of authorship are willing to submit.
Enunciation of a new moral right, therefore, threatens to upset the
balance struck between the interests of creators and consumers in
France. Where the scales tip too far toward creators there is always
the risk that creators' rights will no longer be respected: the law may
set forth one regime, but the public may disregard the law. In such
an event, the letter of the law, or of decisions interpreting the law,
affords creators little meaningful solace.
V.

Conclusion

Tensions between the interests of creators and the interests of persons acquiring property or contract rights in works of authorship inhere in the French moral rights regime. Like many prior decisions
involving conflicts between creators and co-contractants or property
owners, 74 the Cour de cassation's decision in Dubuffet, and the first
instance decision in T.F.1, resolve these tensions in favor of creators.
Unlike prior caselaw, however, the conflicts in these two case arose in
the context of unfinished works which their creators sought to have
completed. The judgments for the creators resulted in the articulation of a new kind of moral right: the right to compel the completion
and divulgation of a commissioned work. Where commissioned works
are at issue, a contract is necessarily implicated. Dubuffet and T.F.1
demonstrate that enforcement of a moral right to compel the completion and divulgation of a commissioned work may entail a narrow,
and perhaps even improbable, interpretation of the contract against
the commissioning party. Moreover, despite the general prohibition
73. We note that law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985, amending and amplifying the law of
March 1I, 1957, does not enlarge the domain of moral rights. Indeed, with regard to computer programs (whose protectibility the new law explicitly recognizes), article 46 of the 1985
law limits the creator's moral rights to the rights to be credited for creating the work; the
rights of withdrawal and in most cases, of integrity, are disallowed.
74. See, e.g., decisions cited supra note 39.
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of judicial enforcement of contract obligations through an award of
specific performace, and despite the cost or interference with property rights that such an award may engender, where the subject of
the contract is a work of authorship, Dubuffet and T.F.1 indicate that
specific performance will be awarded against the commissioning
party. Indeed, where the subject of the contract is a physical artwork
destined for public display, the commissioning party may not exercise
his rights as a property owner to destroy the unfinished work, and
may be obliged to maintain the unwanted work for an indefinite period once the work has been completed. By contrast, no corresponding obligation of performance devolves upon a creator who does not
wish to complete, deliver, or divulge a commissioned work. 5
We emphasize, however, our belief that Dubuffet and T.F. I may and
should represent a fragile jurisprudence. The questionable statutory
basis of a moral right to compel the completion and public exposure
of a commissioned work, and the practical consequences of its enforcement would appear to militate against recognition or perpetuation of the right. Indeed, potential commissioning parties, perceiving
that a commission may for all intents and purposes be both irrevocable and far more burdensome and costly than payment of damages
for breach of contract, may be disinclined to commission the creation
of works of authorship. Thus, it is not entirely clear that the plaintiffs' lopsided victories in Dubuffet and T.F.1 will in fact redound to
the benefit of creators of works of authorship.

75.

See, e.g., decisions cited supra note 41.
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